A few years ago I co-taught a course for first-and second-year doctoral students from different academic areas in our graduate department of religion. As they rotated responsibility for presenting, I noticed a subtle but clear posturing, running just below the surface, written into body postures, gestures, and speaking habits. More credibility and status surrounded those in certain disciplines. For those familiar with theological education, I hardly need say: the more theoretically-focused areas garnered more esteem.
theory, practice, and praxis appear repeatedly in our literature, more frequently than other terms, precisely because a primary disciplinary aim has been to address the modern divorce between academic theology and everyday life.3 Yet those closer to the ground-those with practical knowledge and those who study it-still struggle to validate our particular kind of knowledge. We claim knowledge in practice but struggle to put that knowledge and its value into words and institutional practice. What exactly is going on here? Several dynamics intensify the persistent academic devaluation of practical knowledge and practice and make the conundrum difficult to tackle. How theory relates to practice is actually a problem that has evaded satisfactory resolution for centuries, all the way back to Aristotle.4 As this suggests, epistemology or how we know what we know is in many ways a highly speculative subject, especially for those invested in theology as practical. The categories themselves reflect the hegemony of Western constructs. Why has practical theology's story been told through this terminology anyway? Have we reinforced the very dualism we are critiquing through our obsession with it? And does pursuit of this conjectural matter simply enact the opposite of what practical theologians recommend-attention to the concrete, immediate, and grounded? Theory/practice is simply not a key concern for those in underrepresented communities, as one colleague pointed out.5 Or, as another colleague objected, "haven't we gotten beyond this?" Finally and possibly most troubling, how do we talk about our own devaluation without sounding like complainers, simply furthering alienation and stymieing progress? Do we further reify the hegemony by talking about it? "It is wise," I remark in my presidential address, "to know the politics out of which our discipline emerged…. But it is no longer necessary to start here or bemoan our status."6
